Since many critical decisions impacting human lives are increasingly being made by algorithms, it is important to ensure that the treatment of individuals under such algorithms is demonstrably fair under reasonable notions of fairness. One compelling notion proposed in this context is that of individual fairness, which advocates that similar individuals should be treated similarly [2] . Originally proposed for offline decisions, this notion does not, however, account for temporal considerations relevant for online decision-making. Dynamic notions of individual fairness are already ingrained in many of our societal systems, where they provide a tangible frame of reference for our sense of social justice:
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(1) Law: In many legal systems, once a precedent is set by a ruling, decisions for similar cases observed in the future must follow these precedents. This is often referred to as stare decisis, i.e., to stand by things decided. 1 (2) Whataboutism: There has been a growing culture of whataboutism, which is an argument device used to prove mistreatment by pointing to another similar context that received a different, more conducive, treatment in the past. For example, politicians might defend their questionable actions or advocate no-penalty since a prior political scandal of an opposition party did not go through due process or face significant consequences. (3) Pricing: Bolton et al. [1] find that customers' impression of fairness of prices critically relies on past prices that act as reference points. In particular, they find that any price increases beyond that justified by increase in perceived costs, e.g., due to inflationary effects, are perceived as price gouging and unfair by the customers. Motivated by these examples, in this paper, we extend the notion of individual fairness to account for the time at which a decision is made, in settings where there exists a common notion of conduciveness of decisions as perceived by the affected individuals. The introduction of time allows for a rich set of possibilities. For example, suppose two similar persons A and B apply for a loan at a bank and the bank approves a substantially higher loan amount to B than to A. This would be perceived as unfair (in the colloquial sense) by A, but maybe not by B. Under the classical definition of individual fairness, this distinction is irrelevant -implicitly, it is sufficient that either of the two similar individuals find a drastically different treatment problematic, and hence the loan amounts approved for A and B must be similar. On the other hand, if A applied for the loan earlier than B, then the treatment of A can still be defined to be fair as long as A got approved of a loan that is (approximately) at least as much as that approved for similar people who applied before her. In other words, A's treatment by the bank can be deemed to be fair solely based on the history of decisions at the time when the loan was approved, despite the fact that this treatment turns out to be individually unfair in retrospect when B later gets approved for a substantially higher amount.
Armed with this basic intuition, we propose fairness-in-hindsight: decisions are said to be fair in hindsight if the decisions for incoming individuals are individually fair relative to the past decisions for similar individuals, in the sense that they become more conducive over time by respecting a certain lower bound for rewards * Both authors contributed equally to this research. This is an extended abstract of the work. A draft of the full version of the paper can be found at https://arxiv.org/abs/1812.04069. 1 See https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/stare_decisis. Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s). EC '19, June 24-28, 2019, Phoenix, AZ, USA © 2019 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-6792-9/19/06. https://doi.org/10. 1145/3328526.3329605 or an upper bound for penalties. To contrast this notion and to serve as a baseline, we also consider a more straightforward temporal extension of individual fairness, which we call fairness-across-time, where the treatments of individuals are required to be individually-fair relative to the past as well as the future. This means that irrespective of when they arrive, similar individuals must always receive similar treatment: neither more conducive nor less conducive than what is justified by their degree of dissimilarity.
Our main technical contribution of this paper is to study the implications of these fairness constraints in situations where an algorithm operates under partial information and the true utility model needs to be learned over time. A standard performance metric in such sequential decision-making settings that feature learning is the regret, which is defined as the difference between the optimal utility if the underlying utility model was known, and the utility under the algorithm. Under the fairness-across-time constraint, bad decisions made in the early stages of experimentation may have to be repeated forever. We show that this aspect typically has dire consequences on regret: except for trivial settings, the regret against the benchmark of an optimal individually fair decision-rule grows linearly with the decision horizon.
In contrast, we demonstrate that the situation is not as pessimistic under fairness-in-hindsight: the possibility that decisions can become more conducive over time gives a powerful leeway that allows algorithms to learn and settle on good decisions over time. Formally, we design an algorithm that we call Cautious Fair Exploration (CaFE), which is individually fair in hindsight, and attains sub-linear regret guarantees as compared to the optimal individually-fair benchmark in a wide range of settings. CaFE operates in two phases, exploration and exploitation. In the exploration phase, the decisions are conservative and the goal is to learn the utility model. Once the utility model is learned with the appropriate confidence, the algorithm enters the exploitation phase, where the decisions are then allowed to become more conducive for the appropriate individuals while ensuring individual fairness.
CaFE critically relies on the ability to learn with conservative decisions. But in many situations, learning is slow in the conservative regime and there is a fundamental tradeoff between conservatism and the learning rate that is relevant to the overall regret incurred. Our technical results shed a light on how decisions should be chosen in the exploration phase so as to balance this tradeoff with the goal of minimizing regret. Our sublinear upper bounds on the regret of the resulting algorithm are accompanied by matching lower bounds that justify our design.
The conservative exploration then exploitation structure of CaFE is intuitive and bears resemblance to certain aspects of existing societal systems. For instance, it is typical for legal stances on new issues to be more conservative initially and then potentially become more liberal over time as the impact and nuances of these issues become clear, e.g., decriminalization laws remove penalties for actions perceived as crimes in the past. Similarly, retail sales typically feature markdowns, where the prices of new goods that did not see anticipated demand are decreased over time. Fairness-in-hindsight, actualized by the CaFE architecture, can thus be a practical, first-order safeguard against claims of discrimination in modern algorithmic deployments. 
